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THE REMOVAL POWER OF THE PRESIDENT AND
THE TEST OF RESPONSIBILITY
C. B. Cross*
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the
exercise of removal power by the President have been the subject of
considerable controversy. Justice Jackson criticized' Humphrey's
Executor v. United States' as being a "switch" in the doctrine enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States.3 However, an evalua-
tion of the cases involving the removal powers of the President indicates
that the Supreme Court has been most consistent in adhering to prece-
dent.
The decision of the Court in the Humnphrey case emphasized the
"character of the office" as the ratio decidendi. Thus, if the office is of
a quasi-executive nature in its functions then the President has the
power of removal; if the office is of a predominantly quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial nature in its functions then the President does not have
this power.4 On its surface, the decision in the Humphrey case appears
to conflict with the decision of the Court in the Myers case. Or, as Mr.
Justice Sutherland said in his opinion in the Humphrey case:
To the extent that, between the decision in the Myers case, which sus-
tains the unrestrictable power of the President to remove purely execu-
tive officers, and our present decision that such power does not extend to an
office such as that here involved, there shall remain a field of doubt, we
leave such cases as may fall within it for future consideration and determi-
nation as they may arise.5
However, there is manifested in the Humphrey decision a broader ratio
decidendi, the "test of responsibility," which would eliminate the field
of doubt noted by Mr. Justice Sutherland. An examination of the cases
involving the exercise of removal power by the President indicates that
where the President has been responsible for the administration of a
particular function of government, his use of the removal power has been
upheld by the Supreme Court though ostensibly on narrower grounds
than that of "responsibility." But, in cases where the President has
exercised the removal power without having the responsibility for ad-
ministration vested in him by a Constitutional grant of authority or
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 94, for biographical data.
1 Jackson, The Struggle for judicial Supremacy 107-9 (1941).
2 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
3 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
4 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
5 Id. at 631-2.
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delegated to him by an act of Congress, the Supreme Court has in-
validated presidential removals. The thesis of this article is that the
term "character of the office" not only relates to the nature and func-
tion of the office as the determinant of proper exercise of presidential
removal power, but also contains a more basic and fundamental de-
terminant for the valid use of the removal power-a "test of responsibil-
ity." In order to evaluate the reliability of this proposed test, examina-
tion will be made of: (a) relevant cases, (b) its relationship to the
fundamental "separation of powers" doctrine, and, (c) the possible
conflict of the "test of responsibility" with the duties assigned to the
President by the United States Constitution: to "take care that the
laws be faithfully executed."
RELEVANT CASES
Mr. Justice Peckham, delivering the opinion of the Court in Parsons
v. United States,' discussed the historical development of the power
of the President to remove any officer which he had appointed by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. He quoted the remarks of
Mr. James Madison made in the House of Representatives on May
19, 1789:
That it is the opinion of this committee that there shall be established
an executive department, to be denominated the department .of foreign
affairs; at the head of which there shall be an officer to be called the
secretary of the department of foreign affairs, who shall be appointed by
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and to be
removable by the President.7
After an extensive debate, Congress adopted a bill for this department
which contained Mr. Madison's interpretation of the Constitution. 8 It
is noteworthy that Mr. Madison advocated the establishment of an
"executive" department. This classification of the department leaves
no room for doubt that he intended the President to be responsible for
the operation of the department and, through the removal power, have
adequate means to control its operation.
In Marbury v. Madison,9 Chief Justice Marshall had held that a
justice of the peace of the District of Columbia, appointed in accord
with existing law, was not removable at the will of the President:
Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by President, and
sealed by the Secretary of State, was appointed; and as the law creating
6 167 U.S. 324 (1897).
7 Id. at 328-30, quoting from I Lloyd, Congressional Register 350-1.
8 Ibid.
9 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803).
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the office gave the officer the right to hold for five years, independent of
the executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer
legal rights, which are protected by the laws of his country.' 0 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Mr. Justice Peckham, in reviewing Marbury v. Madison, said that
Congress had exclusive jurisdiction over the District of Columbia, the
district in which the appointment as justice of the peace was to be exer-
cised. In the District of Columbia the President's power to remove an
officer was inoperable, since its officers, though appointed and commis-
sioned by a President of the United States, were responsible to and
under the exclusive direction of Congress. Thus, the accepted dictum
in Marbury v. Madison assumes added significance. In the opinion of
Chief Justice Marshall, President Jefferson lacked the authority to deny
Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace since President Adams
had conferred this commission on Marbury according to the prescribed
will of the body charged by the Constitution with the exclusive legis-
lative control of the area in which the commission was to be used.1 It
would seem then, that the President could not invade the exclusive
jurisdiction of Congress except as that body was willing to make specific
grants of authority.
In the Parsons case the Court upheld the right of the President of the
United States to remove Parsons, a United States District Attorney.
The opinion emphasized the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act and
found almost illimitable grounds for the exercise of the presidential
removal power.
The Tenure of Office Act of 18671 had overruled a practice followed
by the government since 1789 by denying to the President the power
to remove or suspend government personnel. The Act had been aug-
mented by the Army Appropriation Act of 1867,"s which required the
President to obtain the advice and consent of the Senate before he could
remove an officer of the Army, even though this power of removal was
contained in the Constitutional designation of the President as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. Though President Johnson
vetoed these acts on the ground that they created unconstitutional re-
strictions on the President's power of removal, their subsequent passage
reduced the authority, power, and responsibility of the President con-
tained in the Constitution. In 1887, all the restrictions of the Acts of
10 Id. at 162.
11 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, c. 17.
12 14 Stat. 430 (1867), Rev. Stat. § 1767-1772 (1875).
13 14 Stat. 485 (1867).
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1867 were repealed by Congress, 4 thereby marking a return to the
concept of Constitutional supremacy after a twenty year period of Con-
gressional supremacy."5 Said Mr. Justice Peckham:
We are satisfied that its intention in the repeal of the tenure of office sec-
tions of the Revised Statutes was again to concede to the President the
power of removal if taken from him by the original of office act, and by
reason of the repeal to thereby enable him to remove an officer when in his
discretion he regards it for the public good, although the term of office may
have been limited by the words of the statute creating the office. 1 (Em-
phasis supplied.)
Mr. Justice Peckham also quoted the opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan
in McAllister v. United States,17 decided in 1891, to show the continuity
of the Supreme Court in adhering to Marbury v. Madison:
The decision in the present case is a recognition of the complete author-
ity of Congress over territorial offices, in virtue of "those general powers
which that body possesses over the Territories of the United States," as
Marbury v. Madison was a recognition of the power of Congress over
the term of office of a Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia.' 8
Likewise, Mr. Justice Peckham stated that the McAllister case "con-
tains nothing in opposition to the.., construction that had been given
to the Constitution by Congress in 1789 and by the Government generally
since that time and up to the act of 1867.' 1 For in sustaining the action
of the President in removing McAllister as judge of a "legislative" court
established by Congress in Alaskan Territory, Mr. Justice Harlan
pointed out that the power granted to Congress by the Constitution to
administer territories of the United States constituted a sufficient basis
for Congress to delegate the power of removal of certain government
officials to the President, and here Congress had delegated this authority
to the President.0 Clearly, since the Constitution assigns the control
14 24 Stat. 500 (1887).
35 Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 339-41, 343 (1897).
16 Id. at 343.
17 141 U.S. 174 (1891).
18 Id. at 189.
19 Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 337 (1897).
20 Rev. Stat. § 1786 (1875). Moreover, the act creating the civil government for the
Alaskan Territory assigned the administrative responsibility for this territory to the Presi-
dent of the United States.
Sec. 2. That there shall be appointed for the said district [of Alaska] a governor.
. . . He shall make an annual report . . . to the President of the United States, of his
official acts and doings, and of the condition of the said district, with reference to its
resources, industries, population, and the administration of the civil government thereof.
And the President of the United States shall have power to review and to confirm or
annul any reprieves granted or other acts done by him.
23 Stat. 24 (1884).
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of territories of the United States to Congress, the President has only
that amount of control-over territories of the United States which Con-
gress is willing to delegate to him.
Similarly, in the Parsons case the act of Congress establishing the
Department of Justice named it an "executive" department,"' thereby
delegating the necessary administrative control of that department to
the President while retaining overall control only through the power of
the purse and its ultimate legislative power over the department. Thus
by upholding the President's power to remove Parsons and McAllister
the Supreme Court gave its endorsement to the President to remove
personnel who were responsible to him.
In the case of Myers v. United States,2 the court answered the
specific question: Did the President have the power to remove a post-
master of the first class without the advice and consent of the Senate
as required by the statute? Chief Justice Taft said:
The power to remove inferior executive officers, like that to remove
superior executive officers, is an incident of the power to appoint them, and
is in its nature an executive power... 23
Article II [of the Constitution] grants to the President the executive
power of the Government, i.e., the general administrative control of those
executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of
executive officers-a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed. .. 24 (Emphasis supplied.)
Even though the Constitution delegates the power to establish post
offices and post roads to Congress, 5 it seems quite clear that the Court,
by using the word "executive" and the words "removal of executive
officers," felt that the Act of Congress establishing the postal system
gave the responsibility of its administration to the President. This con-
clusion is manifest in the act establishing the Post Office Department:
"There shall be at the seat of the government an executive department
to be known as the Post Office Department. 26 (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover Chief Justice Taft added:
[T] he President's power of removal is further established as an incident
to his specifically enumerated function of appointment by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, but that such incident does not by impli-
cation extend to removals the Senate's power of checking appointments;
and finally that to hold otherwise would make it impossible for the Presi-
21 Rev. Stat. § 346 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 291 (1952).
22 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
23 Id. at 161.
24 Id. at 164.
25 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, d. 7.
26 Rev. Stat. § 388 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 361 (1952).
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dent, in case of political or other differences with the Senate or Congress,
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
27
The function of appointment referred to in these remarks is a part of
the process by which the President established an "executive" depart-
ment, for which he was responsible. The Court, therefore, declared un-
constitutional that portion of the act which required the removal of
postmasters of the first class by the President to be subject to the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate. Here as in the Parsons and McAllister
cases the responsibility of the President for the functioning of this office
was well established by both the Constitution and act of Congress.
This distinguished the Marbury case where Congress was responsible
for the administration of the District of Columbia.
The Supreme Court also used the "test of responsibility" in Hum-
phrey's Executor v. United States.28 Mr. Justice Sutherland there said
that Congress had not relinquished its power to regulate interstate
commerce by creating the Federal Trade Commission, except to grant
the President the power to remove officials for cause.
[T]he language of the act, the legislative reports, and the general pur-
pose of the legislation as reflected by the debates, all combine to demon-
strate the Congressional intent to create a body ... which shall be inde-
pendent of executive authority, except in its selection, and to exercise its
judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official or any de-
partment of the government.2"
It is particularly significant that the act itself requires that the Com-
mission must report to Congress, not to the President. Therefore, the
Court held that the President could not remove Humphrey because
Congress, not the President, was in charge of the Federal Trade Com-
mission. Mr. Justice Sutherland emphasized this distinguishing charac-
teristic of the Humphrey case:
The office of a postmaster is so essentially unlike the office now involved
that the decision in the Myers case cannot be accepted as controlling our
decision here. A postmaster is an executive officer restricted to the perform-
ance of executive functions. He is charged with no duty at all related to
either the legislative or judicial power .... Putting aside dicta, which may
be followed if sufficiently persuasive but which are not controlling, the
necessary reach of the decision goes far enough to include all purely execu-
tive officers. It goes no farther;-much less does it include an officer who
occupies no place in the executive department and who exercises no part of
the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President.80
27 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926).
28 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
29 Id. at 625.
80 Ibid.
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This quotation reveals that the element of control over personnel neces-
sary for the administration of the President's responsibility is a sine qua
non in determining whether he has the authority to exercise the power
of removal. If the power to control and direct the personnel of the
government is not granted to the President by either the Constitution
or by act of Congress, the President is not responsible for the discharge
of duties by such officials, and thus does not have authority to remove
these government officials.
Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Authority"1 further buttresses the argu-
ment for the existence of a "test of responsibility." There the Circuit
Court upheld the President in removing Morgan, a member of the
Board, which performed all three functions: quasi-executive, quasi-
legislative, and quasi-judicial. An examination of the statute definitely
fixes the responsibility of the President to Congress for the operation
and functioning of this Board, regardless of how it accomplishes its as-
signed duties (quasi-executive, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial) .
2
Had the Congress intended to retain control over the Tennessee Valley
Authority, it would have required the .Board to make its reports and
recommendations to Congress instead of providing that the "President
shall ... recommend to Congress."
The District Court, in the Morgan case, also applied the "test of re-
sponsibility." The opinion of this court reads:
I am further of opinion that the chief executive has the power of re-
moval as an incident to the power of appointment, or under the constitu-
tional grant of authority, or both, in the absence of legislative limitation,
whether or not the officer involved is predominantly engaged in the exercise
of quasi legislative or quasi judicial functions .... I am further of opinion
that any attempted legislative limitation should be by express provision,
or by the clearest implication. 3
31 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941).
82 The act provides:
The president is hereby authorized, by such means or methods as he may deem
proper within the limits of appropriations made therefore by Congress, to make such
surveys ... for such Tennessee basin ... as may be useful to Congress.
The president shall, from time to time, as the work provided for in Section 831, u,
[supra] progresses, recommend to Congress such legislation as he deems proper to
carry out the general purposes stated in the said section, and for the especial purpose
[ . . (of] (1) the maximum amount of flood control; (2) the maximum development
of said Tennessee River for navigation.
The President of the United States is hereby authorized to acquire title in the name
of the United States to such rights or such property and to provide payment for same
by directing the board to contract to deliver power generated. . . The President is
further authorized to sell or lease . . . any vacant real estate.
48 Stat. 69 (1933), 16 U.S.C. § 831 (u), (v), (w) (1952).
33 Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 28 F. Supp. 732, 737 (ED. Tenn. 1939).
1954]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
Here the court has partially rested its case on the "constitutional grant
of authority." At the same time the Court disclosed that the grant of
authority could be restricted by future acts of Congress, just as Congress
had earlier fixed administrative responsibility for the Tennessee Valley
Authority in the Executive, by saying: "I am further of opinion that
any attempted legislative limitation should be by express provision, or by
the clearest implication." This last remark would have been valueless
if the court did not believe first, that Congress could delegate this
authority to the President, and secondly, that had Congress intended
to restrict the administrative control delegated to the President it would
have made some definite provision for it aside from cause.
By use of the "test of responsibility," the decisions in the presidential
removal cases, including the Humphrey case, present a clear and un-
broken stream of consistent practice by the Supreme Court.
THE "TEST OF RESPONSIBILITY" AND THE "SEPARATION OF POWERS"
The decision of the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison34 marked
the beginning of the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter in
the interpretation of the United States Constitution. In addition to
determining the meaning of the words of the Constitution, the Court has
had to assume the responsibility for upholding the fundamental doctrine
of limited government which the framers of the Constitution sought to
accomplish by the written constitution, embodying the doctrines of
separation of powers and checks and balances. The "test of responsibil-
ity" therefore must conform to the doctrines of separation of powers
and checks and balances if it is to be a valid measure of the limits of the
removal power of the President.
Mr. Madison's proposal of May 19, 1789, in the House of Representa-
tives indicated that he believed that the executive should have the power
to remove executive officers. This proposal carried with it the idea that
the President would have control and responsibility in the executive
branch of the national government. Though this belief conforms to the
doctrine of separation of powers, it does not answer the question of how
far the power of the executive can be extended in the name of checks
and balances. The remarks of Mr. Madison in The Federalist indicate
that the framers of the Constitution may have intended some limitation
on the "checks and balances" found in the division of powers in the
Constitution.
34 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803).
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[T]here is not a single instance in which the several departments of
power [of the several states] have been kept absolutely separate and dis-
tinct. New Hampshire, whose constitution was the last formed, seems to
have been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency of avoiding any
mixture whatever of these departments, and has qualified the doctrine by
declaring "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers ought to be
kept as separate from, and independent of, each other as the nature of a
free government will admit; or as is consistent with that chain of connection
that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of
unity and amity." Her constitution accordingly mixes these departments
in several respects....
... It is but too obvious that in some instances the fundamental principle
under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture, and even an
actual consolidation, of the different powers; and that in no instance has a
competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation
delineated on paper.8 5
While Mr. Madison believed in some mingling of the powers of govern-
ment, one may seriously question whether he would have favored an
extension of the power of one branch of the national government to
the point where it could completely thwart the intent of the other
branches of the government, unless specifically authorized by the Con-
stitution. Mr. Madison would not have endorsed the placing of a quasi-
legislative agency or commission, which was responsible to Congress
under the close control of the President by granting to him the unlimited
exercise of the removal power. Such an arrangement would give the
President power over an agency for which he would not be responsible.
In Humphrey's Executor v. United States,6 the court rejected the argu-
ment which sought to promote this very situation.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States 7 illus-
trates that there are some areas of authority where Congress cannot in-
trude. In this case, the Court upheld the power of the President to re-
move an executive officer. By way of dictum the Court interpreted
strictly the powers of Congress contained in Article II of the Constitu-
tion:"8 "But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such in-
ferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts
of law, or in the heads of departments." The Court said:
Congress is only given power to provide for appointments and removals of
inferior officers after it has vested, and on the condition that it does vest,
their appointment in other authority than the President with the Senate's
consent; that the provisions of the second section of Article II, which blend
35 The Federalist, No. 47 at 316, 320 (Modern Library ed.).
36 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
37 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
38 U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
1954]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
action by the legislative branch, or by part of it, in the work of the execu-
tive, are limitations to be strictly construed and not to be extended by
implication.... 39
This dictum indicates that the Court believed that Congress could not
delegate administrative control of a branch of the government to the
President and then freely interfere with the work of the executive ex-
cept in the most limited manner. How else could the "separation of
powers" doctrine of our Constitution be effectively maintained? Clearly,
this limitation on the powers of Congress conforms to the "test of re-
sponsibility."
On the other hand, the argument proposed by the United States in
Humphrey case, that according to the dictum in the Myers case the
President should have been able to remove Humphrey, would, if
followed, have contravened our fundamental "separation of powers"
doctrine. Under the arrangement envisaged by this argument the Federal
Trade Commission would have been submitting its reports to Congress,
yet through the President's power of removal, the Commission would
have been subservient to the direct and close control of the President.
The President has a voice in interstate commerce only to the extent that
Congress expressly authorizes it; and even then, Congress cannot dele-
gate the whole of the legislative power to the President, but must im-
pose legislative standards to limit and control the action of the Presi-
dent. Therefore, by holding for Humphrey the court manifestly in-
dicated that the President's power of removal could not be extended
into areas of legislative authority without either Constitutional authority
or the express delegation of the power by Congress.
An examination of the Humphrey opinion shows that the Court con-
sidered the "test of responsibility" in relation to the doctrine of "separa-
tion of powers":
We think it plain under the Constitution that illimitable power of re-
moval is not possessed by the President .... The authority of Congress, in
creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act
in discharge of their duties independently of executive control cannot well
be doubted; and that authority includes as an appropriate incident, power
to fix the period during which they shall continue in office, and to forbid
their removal except for cause in the meantime....
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general
departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive in-
fluence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed
and is hardly open to serious question. So much is implied by the very fact
of the separation of the powers of these departments by the Constitution;
39 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926).
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and in the rule which recognizes their essential co-equality. The sound
application of a principle that makes one master in his own house precludes
him from imposing his control in the house of another who is master
there.40 (Emphasis supplied.)
Obviously the Supreme Court was aware of its duty to maintain the
doctrine of "separation of powers" but it did not intend to change the
boundaries of these three areas of power so carefully drawn in the Con-
stitution. Throughout the history of the United States the Court has
often been compelled to police the areas of power marked out in the
Constitution. In Marbury v. Madison, the Court refused an extension
of its own power contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789. In Schechter
Poultry Corporation v. United States4
1 and Yakus v. United States, 42
the Court required Congress to retain a certain amount of legislative
control over delegations of administrative authority and so in the
Humphrey case, the Court imposed definite limits on the exercise of
executive power by restraining the President from invading an area
expressly reserved to Congress in the Constitution: control over inter-
state commerce where Congress had not delegated authority to the
President beyond that of a highly restricted power to remove ad-
ministrators for cause and cause alone.
THE "TEST OF RESPONSIBILITY" AND THE DUTY OF THE PRESIDENT
There exists another possible conflict in the application of the "test
of responsibility": a conflict between the limited power of the President
implicit in the "test of responsibility" and the apparently broad grants
of presidential power contained in the Constitution "that I will faith-
fully execute the office of President of the United States, and will . . .
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States,"
and "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." 43  These have
often been referred to as the omnibus powers of the President and ap-
pear to extend the authority of the President far beyond the specific
grants of executive power contained in the Constitution. The "test of
responsibility" will have to be reconciled with these seemingly extensive
grants of power if it is to have validity. The treatment accorded the
power of the Executive, contained in quotations from the Constitution,
The Federalist and the remarks of Mr. Justice Sutherland in the Hum-
phrey case further illustrate the cogency of this test.
40 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).
41 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
42 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
43 U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1, cl. 7 and Art. II, § 3.
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The authors of The Federalist, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, dis-
cussed the executive power contained in the Constitution from the view-
point of specific grants of power and further powers of the Executive.
Hamilton's remarks in The Federalist reveal his interpretation of the
omnibus powers of the President:
The administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all
the operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive, or judici-
ary; but in its most usual and perhaps in its most precise significance, it is
limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the
executive department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the pre-
paratory plans of finance, the application and disbursement of the public
moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature, the
arrangement of the army and navy, the direction of the operations of war,
-these, and other matters of like nature, constitute what seems to be most
properly understood by the administration of government. 44
The office of the President, according to Hamilton's beliefs does not have
as extensive powers as may be inferred from the provisions of the Con-
stitution, but is limited to the specifically enumerated powers contained
in the Constitution and the duty of filling in details of administration
assigned by Congress to the President. The Federalist does not accord
more than the briefest mention to the supposedly broad grant of power
contained in the phrase of the Constitution, "... he shall take care that
the laws be faithfully executed." If this phrase contained a broad grant
of executive power it is unlikely that it would have escaped criticism by
those who opposed the adoption of the Constitution. It also would have
been subject to the fullest explanation by authors of The Federalist in
their attempts to secure adoption of the Constitution." This concept
of limited executive power is found in the Humphrey decision where the
Court refused to sanction the executive removal of an administrative
official responsible to Congress. The Court indicated that the President
had only limited power as the Chief Executive of the United States.46
Therefore, the President's duty to "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed," cannot be extended even by implication or inference
to permit the intrusion of the President into areas of our national gov-
ernment neither open to him by a grant of authority contained in the
Constitution nor delegated to him by the Congress. Thus the use of the
"test of responsibility" will not limit duties given to the President by
the Constitution, but instead may serve as a guide to the proper exercise
of the presidential removal power.
44 The Federalist, No. 72 at 468-9 (Modem Library ed.).
45 Id. at 501.
46 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).
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CONCLUSION
The establishment of the "test of responsibility" as the criterion for
the exercise of removal power strongly indicates that the framers of the
Constitution designed a system of government which contains both a
doctrine of limited government and its companion concept-limited
responsibility. The evaluation of cases involving the exercise of presi-
dential removal power indicates that the "test of responsibility" has
been the ratio decidendi though the Court has used rather vague and
confusing expressions. In addition, the suggested test conforms to the
separation of powers and checks and balances doctrines as well as to
the idea of limited presidential authority in the Constitutional grant of
executive power. Therefore, it appears that the "test of responsibility"
is a reliable measure for determining where the President of the United
States may properly exercise his power of removal.
